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DEATH WITH DIGNITY IN
MISSISSIPPI? AN ANALYSIS OF
MISSISSIPPI'S NATURAL DEATH ACT
Michael Vitiello*
I.

INTRODUCTION

At the same moment that medical developments have increased our life span, Americans have become preoccupied with
death. Once a subject considered taboo, the right to death with
dignity is now the frequent subject of popular and professional
attention,' and has inspired the formation of groups to advance
the cause of this "right."' 2 A federal commission appointed to
study ethical problems in medicine and biomedical research
surmised that our current interest in death with dignity stems
from a number of causes: first, "death is less of a private matter
than it once was. Today, dying more often than not occurs under
medical supervision"; second, biomedical developments "have
made death more a matter of deliberate decision. For almost any
life-threatening condition, some intervention can now delay the
moment of death . . . [This is] a development that has
profound ethical and legal implications"; third, courts, legislatures, and commentators have become increasingly involved in a
public debate about death because medical technology often
"renders patients less able . . . to direct-the course of treatment," thereby requiring someone other than the patient to
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola School of Law, New Orleans; B.A.,
Swarthmore College, 1969; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1974.
1 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND

BIOMEDICAL

AND

BEHAVIORAL

RESEARCH,

DECIDING

TO

FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING

1 (1983)(discussing in detail ethical aspects of rejecting various forms of lifesupport) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
2 E.g., Society for the Right to Die, 250 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10107
(one of several groups promulgating living wills). For a listing of other groups that have
promulgated living wills, see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 139 n.51.
TREATMENT
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make treatment decisions for the patient.'
As a result of the increased interest in death and dying, the
need for legislation in this area is generally acknowledged. Unless it is clear that a patient has a right to refuse treatment,
health care professionals may compel a patient to accept unwanted, intrusive therapies that provide marginal net benefit.4
To assert his right to refuse treatment, the patient must initiate
expensive and time-consuming legal proceedings.5 Further, that
process often makes intimate details of a patient's illness a matter of unwanted public scrutiny.' Many people have executed
living wills 7 even in the absence of enabling legislation with the
hope that they will be spared this traumatic legal struggle.8
Health care professionals have an interest in legislation as
well. Legislation assists hospitals in establishing policies to govern the withdrawal of treatment.' Without legislation or clear

REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-2.
See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(terminally ill patient, forced by hospital personnel to accept treatment despite his repeated
requests to die, allowed to remove artificial life-sustaining device based on constitutional
right of privacy), afl'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
1 In a number of cases, the patient died before a final decision could be rendered.
See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984)(patient
died over three years before final decision); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209,
1219 (1985)(patient died prior to decision by New Jersey Supreme Court); In re Storar,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 66 (consolidated cases in which both patients had died
prior to decision by New York Court of Appeals), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
8 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1217-18 (1985)(discussing in
detail patient's physical and mental condition).
Living wills are "documents . . . by which individuals can indicate their preference not to be given 'heroic' or 'extraordinary' treatments." COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 1, at 139.
8 One group, Concern for Dying, has circulated millions of copies of standard form
"living wills" in a pamphlet entitled Questions and Answers About the Living Wills,
cited by COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 139 nn.49 & 52. The terms "living wills,"
"advance directives," and "declarations" are used largely interchangeably to refer to a
document which "lets people anticipate that they may be unable to participate in future
decisions about their own health care . . . [and] specifies the types of care a person
wants (or does not want) to receive ....
" COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 136.
Only recently has a court been faced with an unconscious patient who had executed a
living will. That court found the document was "persuasive evidence of [an] incompetent
person's intention and [thus] should be given great weight" by the patient's surrogate
decisionmaker. John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984).
9 See, e.g., Bayley, Who Should Decide?, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 3, 10-11 (A. Doudera & J. Peters eds. 1982)(commentary
3 COMMISSION

4
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judicial pronouncements, acquiescence in a patient's or his surrogate's refusal to accept treatment may leave the health care
provider open to suit'0 or to criminal prosecution." That fear
may make patients and health care providers potential adversaries, with litigation rather than consultation determining the appropriate course of treatment.' 2 Courts have frequently requested legislative action to define the parameters of a right to
refuse treatment and to establish appropriate procedures.' s At
least one court has independently fashioned guidelines where

on living will legislation) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS]; Van ScoyMosher, An Oncologist's Case for No-Code Orders, id. at 14, 17 (discussing drafting of
guidelines for writing order not to resuscitate); Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 242 (1978)(stating that physicians should seek
legislative protection for defense in Saikewicz-type cases) [hereinafter cited as A Medical Viewpoint]. But cf. Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: Judges as Physicians, 298
N.E.J. MED. 508, 509 (1978)(legislation should not impose on decision-making process of
physician).
10 See, e.g., United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 609 (E.D.N.Y.
1983)(suit by government to compel medical records for seriously ill newborn), aff'd, 729
F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984); Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186,
1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (suit by "stranger" to compel treatment of seriously ill newborn), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 560 (1983).
" See, e.g., Oakes, A Prosecutor'sView of Treatment Decisions, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra note 9, at 194, 199 (withdrawal of life support could subject physicians to criminal liability); Robertson, Legal Aspects of Withholding Medical Treatment
from Handicapped Children, id. at 213, 217-18 (liability of attending physician regarding defective newborns); Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasiaof Defective Newborns: A
Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 213, 224-35 (1975)(discussing criminal liability of physicians and hospitals that refuse ordinary lifesaving medical care for defective infants)
[hereinafter cited as Defective Newborns]. But cf. Ginex, A Prosecutor's View on Criminal Liability for Withholding Medical Care: The Myth and the Reality, in LEGAL AND
ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra note 9, at 205, 208-09 (noting that in rare instances where physician is charged, numerous obstacles remain for prosecution).
"' See, e.g., A Medical Viewpoint, supra note 9, at 238-42 (discussing exemplary
cases with distressing solutions, concluding that better alternative is consultation). See
also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 43-51 (discussing collaboration between patient and health care provider as essential to good decision-making).
" See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1346 (Del.
1980)(inviting "prompt attention" of legislature to enact state policy governing these
matters); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980)(stating that this type issue
is more suitably addressed in legislative forum); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d
1209, 1221 (1985)(noting absence of legislation on this topic); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74 (1981)(emphasizing that enlargement of role of courts in these
situations, if desirable, should be made by legislature); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114,
660 P.2d 738, 752 (1983)(inviting legislature to address this "sensitive" issue).
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the state legislature failed to act expeditiously,"' and other
courts have provided elaborate procedures for the exercise of a
comatose patient's right to refuse treatment.1 5 These courts,
however, have been criticized for usurping the legislatures'
proper function.'6
With the passage of its Natural Death Act, codified in sections 41-41-101 to -121 of the Mississippi Code,'7 Mississippi has
joined the trend toward legislative recognition of a right to refuse medical treatment. This article offers a brief review of natural death acts from other jurisdictions and some of the problems
raised by those statutes.18 It then examines patients' rights to
refuse medical treatment in Mississippi. Although this article focuses on Mississippi's Natural Death Act,' 9 the provisions of the
Act are not the only source of law governing medical treatment
1"In Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980), the Florida Supreme Court
expressly deferred to the power of the state legislature to establish guidelines, stating "It
is the type issue which is more suitably addressed in the legislative forum, where fact
finding can be less confined and the viewpoints of all interested institutions and disciplines can be presented and synthesized." Four years later, after the Florida legislature
failed to respond to this plea for guidance, the court took the initiative and set up procedures for patients and their families to assert their right to resist treatment. See John F.
Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 352 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984)(court used doctrine of
"substituted judgment"). The legislature did, in fact, adopt a natural death act in 1984.
See Life Prolonging Procedure Act, ch. 84-58, 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 40 (West).
18 See, e.g., Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 550 (establishing procedure for
withdrawal of extraordinary life-sustaining measures from terminally ill and comatose
patient), modified sub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 665-72 (discussing factors in
determining whether life-support apparatus should be discontinued), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976). Most recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court has created even more
elaborate procedures when treatment is to be withdrawn from a patient confined to a
nursing home. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-35 (1985)(analysis of
prerequisite evidence that must be present before treatment may be discontinued).
1s See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67 (emphasizing that courts
are not empowered to prescribe rules in matters such as these), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981). See also Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980)(recognizing that
this type issue is more suitably addressed in legislative forum); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432 n.18
(1977)(stating that formulation of guidelines applicable to medical emergencies involving
incompetent persons is better left to legislature).
" See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1984)(withdrawal of life-saving
mechanisms).
'8 See infra notes 23-89 and accompanying text.
'9 See infra notes 90-121 and accompanying text.
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decisions in Mississippi. The Act must be read in conjunction
with Mississippi's long-standing Medical Consent Act 20 and with
emerging constitutional principles. The article also reviews some
recurring problems that face patients, health care providers, and
courts, and analyzes how those issues might be resolved in Mississippi. It concludes that Mississippi's Natural Death Act has
failed to avoid some of the pitfalls of earlier legislation and will
not resolve the most frequent and difficult cases because the Act
is too narrow in its scope.2 1 Finally, it concludes that the Act is
uncertain in several important ways. 2
II.

A

REVIEW OF NATURAL DEATH ACTS

The California legislature enacted the first natural death
act 2 3 in 1976,24 partially in response to In re Quinlan,25 in which
discontinuance of extraordinary treatment was sought for a
twenty-one year old woman in a persistent vegetative state.
Subsequently, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia
have enacted natural death acts.2 6 This section reviews several of
20

21
22
23

MIsS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (Supp. 1984).
See infra notes 134-256 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 257-309 and accompanying text.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985)(Natural Death

Act).
24 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 143 (discussing California's Natural
Death Act).
25 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
natural
26 As of. 1983, thirteen states and the District of Columbia had enacted
death acts. These states included Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, and Washington.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 141, 318-87 (Appendix D)(providing natural
death statutes of each state as of 1983). Since 1983, twenty-two additional states have
enacted natural death statutes: Florida, Life Prolonging Procedure Act, ch. 84-58, 1984
Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 40 (West); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (Supp. 1984);
Illinois, Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, §§ 701-709 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985); Iowa, Life-Sustaining Procedures, 1985 Iowa Legis. Serv. No. 1 (West); Louisiana,
Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures, 1985 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act No.
187 (West)(to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.58.8); Maryland, MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1985); Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. §§
41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1984); Virginia, VA. CODE § 54-325:8.1-8.13 (Supp. 1984); West
Virginia, W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (Supp. 1984); Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. ANN. §
154.01-.15 (West Supp. 1984); and Wyoming, WYo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -151 (Supp.
1984). As this issue went to press, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah had also recently en-
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those acts and discusses some of their shortcomings.
The California Natural Death Act was passed amidst considerable political controversy, perhaps explaining some of its
inadequacies.27 A declarant must use the standard form in the
Act, which provides that if death is imminent, life-sustaining
procedures should be withheld or removed. 28 The directive must
be reexecuted every five years.2 It is legally binding only if it
has been executed or reexecuted at least fourteen days after the
patient has been diagnosed as terminally ill.3o If executed prior
to the fourteen-day waiting period, the directive is probative of a
patient's desire, but is only one factor for the physician to consider.3 1 Even if all conditions are met, a physician may refuse to
comply with the directive if he transfers the patient to another
physician.32 The Act makes no provision for cases in which an
incompetent patient has made no directive.
Criticisms of the California Act are several. The Act sets up
unreasonable obstacles to the exercise of a patient's right to refuse treatment. Advocates of the right to refuse treatment contend that our society recognizes a fundamental right of self-determination,"3 reflected in common-law doctrines like informed
consent34 and in the constitutional right to privacy. 35 The fourteen-day waiting period is a form of unjustified medical pater-

acted living will legislation. Concern for Dying Newsletter, Summer 1985, at 2.
27 Rosoff, Living Wills and Natural Death Acts, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS,
supra note 9, at 186, 190.
-

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188.

" Id. § 7189.5.
-o Id. § 7188.
3I Id. § 7191(c).
32 Id. § 7191(b).
3 See, e.g., CONCERN FOR DYING, A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE LIVING WILL 4 (1979)(rights
of competent patients). See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 43 (discussing
patient's interest in self-determination).
3 See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 516, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (1905)(operation performed without plaintiff's consent unlawful); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp.,
211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)(stating that every human being has right to determine what shall be done with his own body).
35 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (discussing vegetative
patient's constitutional right of privacy), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Interestingly,
the California legislature drafted its narrow statute despite an express state constitutional right to privacy. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (recognition of privacy as an inalienable right).
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nalism,36 suggesting that a competent adult not yet critically ill
cannot decide his own fate. 37 A related problem with the fourteen-day waiting period is that, as a practical matter, it will
often defeat the right recognized by the statute. Patients frequently die within fourteen days after the diagnosis of terminal
illness. Under the California Act, those patients are forced to
end their lives accepting unwanted treatment. Alternatively, patients may become incompetent during the waiting period, and
thereby become disqualified to assert their desires.3 8 This problem has been ameliorated, however, by California's recent expansion of its Durable Power of Attorney statute to cover health
care decisions. 3 9 Those provisions, in effect, allow a person to appoint in advance an agent to make medical decisions on his behalf should he later become incompetent. That addition should
also correct another failing of the California Natural Death Act
in that the Act provides an obligatory standard form. 40 Such a
form is easy to use without giving serious thought to the problem at hand. The language, however, may be ambiguous or
overly general, requiring interpretation by others and in effect
substituting their judgment for that of the patient. The right to
refuse treatment is grounded on notions of individualism; standard forms paint with a broad brush, treating as of one mind all

For a critique of medical paternalism, see J. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE?
162-85 (1982)(discussion of refusal of lifesaving medical treatment, decision-making for
incompetent patients, active euthanasia, and assisted suicide).
" Cf. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983)(holding that Akron ordinance prohibiting physician from performing abortion until 24 hours after pregnant woman signed consent form impermissibly burdened woman's
constitutional right of privacy).
" COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 142, offers the following criticism of California's waiting period:
A patient must wait 14 days after being told of the diagnosis before he or she
can sign a directive, which would require a miraculous cure, a misdiagnosis, or
a very loose interpretation of the word "imminent" in order for the directive to
be of any use to a patient ....
[A] study of California physicians one year
after the new law was enacted found that only about half the patients diagnosed as terminally ill even remain conscious for 14 days.

Id.
', See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2430-2443 (West Supp. 1985)(legislative authorization giving attorney power to make health care decision for principal).

10

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§

7188.
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patients who want to refuse some treatment."'
An additional problem is that the California Act is silent on
the most frequently recurring situation: a patient has not prepared an advance directive and is now incompetent.4 2 In these
circumstances "s the statute is irrelevant, except perhaps as a
statement of public policy that California recognizes a right to
refuse treatment. The Act does not establish a procedure for
such cases, and this is the area in which courts have most frequently requested legislative action.4"
Despite its infirmities, the California Act became a model
for several other states,' 5 with some limited modifications. For
example, in 1977 both Texas and Oregon enacted laws largely
tracking the California Act.'6 Both of these statutes have been
amended to avoid some of the pitfalls of the California Act. The
Texas Act was amended in 1979. The amendments abolished requirements that the directive must be reexecuted every five
years and that it was not binding until fourteen days after a diagnosis of a terminal illness.' 7 More recently, the Oregon legisla-

4, See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 136-53 (discussing various
forms and aspects of advance directives).
", Rosoff, supra note 27, at 191.
" See, e.g., Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 654-55 (21-year old woman entered persistent, vegetative coma).
4 See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486
(1983)(stating that this issue had not been adequately addressed by legislature); Severns
v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1346 (Del. 1980)(inviting legislature to
enact comprehensive policy governing these matters); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015,
1019 (La. 1982)(noting that legislature had not established procedure for parents of incompetent person to withdraw life-support systems when person entered permanent and
irrevocable comatose condition); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221
(1985)(legislature had not enacted procedures for these situations). See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 660 (quoting amicus brief statement that courts and legislative bodies may simply need to recognize present medical standards and practices),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
" See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (Supp. 1984)(Natural Death Act); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 -.690 (1983)(withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining procedures); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 -.090 (1983)(rights with respect to terminal illness); TEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1985)(Natural Death Act); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN, §§ 70.122.010-.122.905 (Supp. 1985)(Natural Death Act).
" See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1983)(rights with respect to terminal illness);
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1985)(Natural Death Act).
11 TEx. REy. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h.
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ture enacted similar amendments to its Natural Death Act.' 8
Several states have adopted natural death acts without reliance on the California Act.'9 Under the North Carolina statute,"
the provisions of a directive are triggered when two physicians
determine that a patient's condition is "terminal" and "incurable."'" A patient may execute a living will at any time, and
while the statute contains a model form, strict adherence is not
required. 2 The "will," however, is subject to interpretation by
the treating physician and no penalties are provided for a physician who ignores the declaration.5 3 Another important innovation is that the North Carolina Act includes procedures for withdrawal of treatment from an incompetent patient who has not
executed an advance directive. A family member may request
that extraordinary treatment be withheld or withdrawn from an
unconscious person with "no reasonable possibility" of returning
to a "cognitive sapient state." Treatment can be terminated only
if the condition is "terminal," "incurable," and "irreversible," as
determined by the attending physician and confirmed in writing
by a second physician. 5 4 Further, the statute allows withdrawal
only of treatment considered "extraordinary means," which is
defined as treatment that "would serve only to postpone artificially the moment of death by sustaining, restoring, or supplanting a vital function."55
As indicated, the North Carolina Act avoids some of the pitfalls of the California Act. Nonetheless, it has some weaknesses,
such as granting virtually unfettered discretion to the physician.
" See OR. REv. STAT. § 97.055(6)(eliminating reexecution provisions); § 97.075 (section requiring 14-day waiting period repealed).
" See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1983)(death with dignity);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1978 & Supp. 1984)(Right to Die Act); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 90-320 to -322 (Supps. 1981 & 1983)(right to natural death; brain death).
:0 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (Supps. 1981 & 1983).
1 Id. § 90-321(b).
42 Id.
§ 90-321(d).
:3 Id. § 90-321(c).
' Id. § 90-322 (Supp. 1983). Prior to the 1983 amendment, determination of the
patient's condition was to be established by a majority of three physicians, including the
attending physician. Id. § 90-322(a)(2)(Supp. 1981). The Act does not specify that it
applies only to adults, thus leaving open the use of these procedures for seriously ill
newborns and other minors.
"5 Id. § 90-321(a)(2).
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For example, the Act states that "[t] he attending physician may
rely upon a signed, witnessed, dated and proved declaration
... ,,5 The Act provides no penalty for a physician who refuses to comply with a properly executed declaration. Additionally, it does not require a physician to transfer a patient if the
attending physician refuses to comply with the declaration. Further, the Act gives unreviewed discretion to an attending physician of a terminally ill incompetent patient who has no spouse,
guardian, or relative of the first degree. 7
Some advocates of the right to die considered many of the
early statutes unnecessarily restrictive and inconsistent with the
constitutional status of the asserted right.5 8 After nine states
had enacted natural death laws, the Society for the Right to Die
recruited students involved in the Yale Law School Legislative
Services program to draft an act which would avoid these shortcomings. The proposal which resulted was substantially enacted
by the state of Kansas in 1979.11 Unlike the California statute,
the Kansas Act 60 permits a person to prepare an advance declaration at any time.6 1 Subsequent incompetence does not invalidate that declaration; consequently, no waiting period is required after a diagnosis of terminal illness. 2 A patient need not
be informed that a condition is terminal. Along with about half
of the other states having natural death acts, Kansas nullifies a
directive if the patient is pregnant.6 3 Revocation is made extremely easy. 4 Additionally, punishment is provided for (1) a
physician who refuses to comply with a declaration if he also

Id. § 90-321(c)(emphasis added).
Id. § 90-322(b). Section 90-322 provides guidelines for an attending physician to
allow a patient to die a natural death in the absence of a declaration. The physician must
have the approval of the patient's spouse or guardian or a majority of the relatives of the
first degree, if they are available. Id.
" See infra notes 149-172 and accompanying text.
11Rosoff, supra note 27, at 190-91.
1oKAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1980).
61Id. § 65-28,101.
Id. § 65-28,106.
"

.7

62

" Id. § 65-28,103(a).
" See id. § 65-28,104. A declaration may be revoked in writing, by oral expression of
intent to revoke, or by implication as evidenced by the destruction or deterioration of
the declaration. Id.
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refuses to transfer the patient;6 5 (2) a person who hastens another's death by falsifying a declaration or concealing its revocation;6s (3) a person who prolongs the life of another against his
will by concealing a declaration or by falsifying a revocation. 7
Despite the input of advocates of natural death, the Kansas
Act is less than perfect. While it requires that a condition be
terminal before a declaration becomes operative, it fails to define that term, leaving open the question whether death must
also be imminent.6 As discussed below, that question has arisen
frequently in litigated cases. 9 Equally important is the failure of
the Act to provide for procedures in the case of an incompetent
patient who has failed to execute a declaration when competent
or who has never been competent. 0
More recently, Delaware enacted a bill7 1 which includes a
significant innovation. Most acts contemplate a form, either prescribed 72 or suggested7 3 that specifies unwanted therapies.7 4 Delaware allows a similar directive to be prepared, 6 but also recognizes the right of a competent person to appoint an agent to act
as a surrogate decisionmaker if the declarant becomes
76
incompetent.
Despite the identifiable weaknesses of some of the earlier
statutes, including the Model Act, some states have adopted

" Id. § 65-28,107(a).
66 Id. § 65-28,107(c).
67 Id. § 65-28,107(b).
11 See id. § 65-28,102 (omitting statutory definition of terminal illness).
09 See infra notes 288-309 and accompanying text.
7o See infra notes 229-56 and accompanying text.
71 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2501-2509 (1983)(§ 2509 repealed in 1983).
71 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (providing that directive shall be in
form provided by statute).
73 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103(c)(providing form declaration but allowing
inclusion of "other specific directions").
74 Typically, the form declaration provides that "life-sustaining procedures" are to
be withdrawn under certain conditions. See, e.g., Medical Treatment Decision Act
(Model Bill) § 3, reprinted in COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 314-15 (authorizing
removal of life-sustaining devices where such devices serve only artificially to prolong
dying process).
75 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2502(a), 2503(a)(recognizing patient's right to make
written directive refusing medical or surgical treatment).
76 Id. § 2502(b). This provision has been characterized as avoiding "serious shortcomings" of natural death acts in other states. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 145.
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those statutes largely unchanged.7 7 Other states have borrowed
heavily from those acts, but have grafted on additional provisions. The recently enacted Louisiana statute is illustrative. 78
Several sections of the Louisiana Act track the Model Act and
acts derived therefrom. For example, the Louisiana Act's preamble and definitions are largely modeled on those sources,79 as are
its proposed declaration, 0 its provisions for revocation,8" and its
provisions governing the legal effect of the patient's death on
insurance coverage.8 2 The Louisiana Act, however, provides specifically that a declarant may alter the proposed form by inclusion of "specific directions including but not limited to a designation of another person to make the treatment decision for the
declarant ....
"83 It also makes severable valid and invalid
directives.""
Louisiana also provides detailed procedures concerning the
terminally ill incompetent patient who has failed to make a declaration. Specifically, upon a diagnosis of terminal and irreversible illness,8 5 treatment may be terminated if there is agreement

77 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984)(Natural Death Act, substantially
similar to Medical Treatment Decision Act [Model Bill]).
78 Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures, 1985 La. Sess. Law Serv.
Act No. 187 (West)(to be codified at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.58.8).
79 Compare id. § 40:1299.58.1 with Medical Treatment Decision Act [Model Bill] §
1, reprinted in COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 313, and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 6528,101 (substantial similarities among these provisions).
so Compare Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures, 1985 La. Sess.
Law Serv. Act No. 187 (West)(to be codified at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3(C)(1))
with Medical Treatment Decision Act [Model Bill] § 3, reprinted in COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 1, at 314-15; ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(c)(1984); and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 6528,103(c)(discussing form of directive).
"' Compare Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures, 1985 La. Sess.
Law Serv. Act No. 187 (West)(to be codified at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.4) with
Medical Treatment Decision Act [Model Bill] § 4, reprinted in COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 1, at 314-15; ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5 (1984); and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,104
(providing for revocation of declaration).
Il Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.10(B)(2)(West Supp. 1985) with Medical Treatment Decision Act [Model Bill] § 8(b), (c), reprinted in COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 1, at 316-17; ALA. CODE § 22-8A-9 (1984); and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,108(b),
(c)(discussing effect of declaration on insurance policies and coverage).
81 Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures, 1985 La. Sess. Law Serv.
Act No. 187 (West)(to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3(C)(1)).
Id. § 40:1299.58.3(C)(2).
Id. § 40:1299.58.2(7) defines a "qualified patient"-that is, a patient from whom
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between the attending physician and specified surrogate decisionmaker 6 Also innovative, but more controversial, the Act includes procedures to govern withdrawal of life-support systems
from terminally and irreversibly ill minors."7 These procedures
are controversial because under no circumstances is a mature
minor allowed to make a decision for himself.88 This may conflict with the Supreme Court's analysis in the abortion context
where mature minors have a right to privacy virtually coterminous with that of an adult, not subject to veto by a third party.89
A review of natural death acts from other jurisdictions indicates that generally legislatures have been responsive to
problems in predecessor acts. The perfect act has yet to be
drafted, but recent statutes have been innovative, for example,
in developing procedures for incompetents without advance directives and in encouraging appointment of a surrogate as an alternative to specifying unwanted treatment.
III.

Mississippi's

NATURAL DEATH ACT

Mississippi's Natural Death Act was intended to authorize
"withdrawal of life-sustaining mechanisms" under certain carefully circumscribed conditions.9 0 This section reviews the provisions of the Act.

treatment may be withdrawn-as a person suffering from a "terminal and irreversible
condition." The requirement of irreversibility is redundant because, as the Act was originally introduced, a "terminal condition" was "a condition. . . which, regardless of the
application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical judgment,
produce death and serve only to postpone the moment of the death of the patient." H.B.
996, La. Reg. Sess., 1983. Thus a terminal condition is already an irreversible one because death will follow even with treatment. See id. (death must be imminent).
86 Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures, 1985 La. Sess. Law Serv.
Act No. 187 (West)(to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5).
87 Id. § 40:1299.58.6.
Id. The minor's parent, guardian, or spouse may execute the declaration on behalf
of the minor. The spouse must have reached the age of majority. Id.
" See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 442
(1983)(statute requiring parental consent to abortion for all minor pregnant women
under 15 held unconstitutional); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979)(plurality
opinion by Powell, J.)(state requiring pregnant minor to obtain parental consent to abortion must provide alternative procedure allowing authorization of abortion; pregnant minor entitled to prove maturity or that abortion would be in her best interests).
9' MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-101.
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Under the Act, a person may execute a declaration if he
wants to authorize the withdrawal of life-sustaining mechanisms.
Section 41-41-107(1) provides a standard form of that declaration.9 1 Several requirements must be met for a form to be binding. A person must be mentally competent and at least eighteen
years old when he executes a declaration.9 2 The person apparently may execute the document at any time, not only after
learning that he is terminally ill. The declarant must sign the
instrument in the presence of at least two witnesses, 3 who attest
not only to the genuineness of the signature, but also to the declarant's competence.94 A witness must know the declarant;9 5
however, a witness cannot be related to the declarant," a stand to
benefit from the person's estate,97 be an attending physician, or
be an employee of the physician or of the health care facility
treating the patient.9 8
Section 41-41-107 contains two requirements that will limit
the utility of the Act. First, a declarant must "substantially" follow the prescribed form.9 9 Second, a declaration is valid only if
filed with the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the State Board of
Health.1 00 The sections covering the standard form 0 1 and withdrawal of treatment 0 2 also narrow the right to refuse medical
treatment. Only if the person has executed a declaration and
certain conditions are met can he insist that he be withdrawn
from "life-sustaining mechanisms.' 0 3 Those mechanisms are defined as "extraordinary techniques and applications, including
mechanical devices, which prolong life through artificial

Id. § 41-41-107(1).
o' Id. § 41-41-105.
Id. § 41-41-107, 111.
Id. § 41-41-107(1). This is the preferred role of witnesses. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 149 (stating that some way should be established to demonstrate
declarant's legal competence at execution of directive).
"' Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-107(1).
"

.3
9

96 Id. § 41-41-107(1), 111.

1 Id. § 41-41-111.
98 Id.
"
100
10
10

Id. § 41-41-107(1).
Id. § 41-41-107(2).
Id. § 41-41-107(1).
Id. § 41-41-113.

103 Id.
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means." 10 4 Before the declaration can be honored, the. declarant
must have become terminally ill and be unconscious or suffering
"severe distress."' 10 5 The diagnosis of terminal illness must be
made by the declarant's physician and confirmed by at least two
other physicians. The physicians must also confirm that the patient cannot regain a meaningful state of health and that death
is imminent absent the use of life-sustaining mechanisms. 0 6 The
Act specifically disclaims authorizing mercy killing by act or
omission."' 1
Special provisions apply if the terminally ill person is pregnant. Her declaration cannot be honored during the pregnancy.
The Act makes no distinction between early and late
pregnancies. Although not entirely clear, the Act apparently requires a pregnant but terminally ill woman to carry her fetus to

term. 108
Section 41-41-109 provides that a declarant may revoke his
declaration. Similar to section 41-41-107, it requires a declarant
to follow substantially a standard form which states quite simply
that he "revoke[s] the declaration" previously made. 10 9 Section
41-41-109 contains the same requirements concerning witnesses
as does section 41-41-107,10 and the revocation must also be
filed with the Board of Health."' There are instances, however,
when a declarant may revoke a declaration without adherence to
the foregoing formalities. Subsection 41-41-109(3) allows a declarant "unable physically to execute a revocation" formally to
do so by any clear expression, "oral or otherwise.""' 2 Subsection

Id.
Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
10' Id.
'o

100

§ 41-41-103.
§ 41-41-113.

§ 41-41-117(2).
§ 41-41-107(1). It would appear that a woman has no choice under the Act to
provide otherwise because that section states that a declarant must "substantially" follow that form. Id.
100 Id.
§ 41-41-109(1).
110 Id. § 41-41-111.
Id. § 41-41-109(2).
11
Id. § 41-41-109(3). The Act provides no procedure to guarantee that the declarant has made a bona fide revocation. For example, there is no requirement that there be
witnesses other than the person to whom the revocation is made. Id. Further, no penalties are provided where a person forges a revocation. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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41-41-109(4) permits the attending physician to ask the declarant whether he revokes his declaration if the physician knows or
has "reason to believe" that a declaration has been made and if
the physician is about to perform "procedures which might reasonably be expected to cause the declarant to become permanently unconscious or unable to make his wishes known .... "
In the latter case, the physician determines whether the declara'1 3
tion has been revoked.
Sections 41-41-115 and 41-41-117 clarify the extent of a
physician's duty in participating in the withdrawal of life-sustaining mechanisms. A determination that a declaration has
been made is a precondition to withdrawal of treatment under
section 41-41-115. The physician must contact the Board of
Health for "a certified copy of the declaration and a certificate
that no revocation has been filed .
"114 The Act does not require health care providers to withdraw treatment from the patient; however, the noncomplying provider has a duty to cooperate with efforts to transfer the patient to a physician or facility
that will withdraw treatment. ' Section 41-41-117 provides a
complying physician with a good faith defense to criminal or
civil proceedings. It also provides, in effect, that good faith compliance with a declaration cannot be construed as unprofessional
conduct. 1 6
Section 41-41-119 governs the patient's relationship to his
insurers. Withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is not suicide,
according to the Act,11 7 and may not, therefore, affect terms of
life insurance policies.1 18 Similarly, health insurers cannot require a person to consent to have treatment withdrawn as a condition for coverage. 11 9
Finally, section 41-41-121 provides for sanctions. A person
who hastens a patient's death by forging or coercing a declaration or concealing the existence of a revocation "shall be guilty"

M
114

Id.

§

41-41-109(4).

Id. § 41-41-115(1).

Id. § 41-41-115(2).
Id. § 41-41-117(1).
117Id. § 41-41-119(1).
Id. § 41-41-119(2), (3).
'

Id. § 41-41-119(4).
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of a felony. A person convicted of that offense "shall be sentenced to the custody of the Department of Corrections for not
more than twenty (20) years."1 2 No crime or punishment is provided for a person who keeps a person alive against his will by
forging or coercing a revocation of a declaration."'

IV. A

CRITIQUE OF MISSISSIPPI'S NATURAL DEATH ACT

Several aspects of Mississippi's Natural Death Act are noteworthy. Although this section discusses some of the strengths of
the Act, it is primarily devoted to a critical analysis of the Act
and several serious shortcomings of the law, both from a public
policy and a constitutional viewpoint.
A.

Strengths of the Act

Mississippi's Natural Death Act avoids some of the failings
of earlier legislation. For example, the Act permits a person to
execute a declaration at any time. Section 41-41-105 requires
only that a person be at least eighteen years old when he executes the document."2 1 Further, a patient does not have to be
aware of his terminal condition to make the declaration operative.12 3 The only requirement of notice to the patient is contained in section 41-41-109(4). That section provides, in effect,
that if the physician has reason to know that a patient has executed a declaration, and if he is about to perform procedures
which "might reasonably be expected to" render the patient unable to communicate, the physician may ask the patient whether
he revokes his declaration. 2 4 Notice is thus never mandatory.
The Act carefully limits who may serve as a witness. As with
other acts,1 25 Mississippi's Natural Death Act prevents a person
from serving as a witness if he has a conflict of interest. The
...Id. § 41-41-121.
l"

Id.

Id. § 41-41-105.
Id. § 41-41-113 (declaration may be operative if patient suffers "severe distress"
or unconsciousness as result of terminal condition).
Id. § 41-41-109(4).
"'
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(c)(3)(witnesses must state that they do not
have conflict of interest).
"'

.23
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conflict may arise in two different ways. The Act obviously prevents a witness from having a financial interest in bringing
about a swifter death for the patient.1 26 On the other hand,
while a patient may wish to forego life-sustaining treatment, his
family members often desire to prolong his life because of their
own personal needs.1 27 The Act thus also prohibits family members from witnessing either a declaration or a revocation. 28 Finally, the Act prohibits attending physicians, their employees,
and employees of the health care facility where the patient is
1 29
located from serving as witnesses.
The Act protects both the health care provider and the patient if the provider resists withdrawal of treatment. Physicians
do not agree on how heroic dying patients ought to be. Some
would like to see the patient endure as long as possible if only so
that the physician may learn more about the particular disease."' While the physician is entrusted with some unreviewed
discretion,1 31 the physician whose principles dictate against
withdrawal of treatment has a duty to transfer the patient.1 32
Thus, he is not forced to choose between his own principles and
his patient's right of self-determination. The Act also establishes
a good faith immunity for the complying physician,13 3 thereby
alleviating fear of criminal and civil suit.
B.

Weaknesses of the Act

Several criticisms may be levelled against Mississippi's Nat12
117

MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-111(b), (d).
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 47-48 (discussing family response to

impending death).
228
"'

MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-111(a).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-111(c).

"0 See, e.g., Karnofski, Why Prolong the Life of a Patient with Advanced Cancer?,
10 CA, Jan.-Feb. 1960, at 10 (urging patients to fight until overcome by death). See also
Y. Kamisar, A Life Not (Or No Longer) Worth Living: Are We Deciding the Issue Without Facing It? 8-12 (Nov. 10, 1977)(Mitchell Lecture delivered at the State University of
New York at Buffalo).
Il See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-109(4). An attending physician who believes
that a patient has executed a declaration may question the patient as to whether he
wishes to revoke his declaration. The physician's determination as to the patient's answer is final. Id.
..
2 Id. § 41-41-115(2).
".. Id. § 41-41-117(1).
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ural Death Act. First, since it is unclear whether the Act was
intended to serve as the exclusive vehicle for assertion of the
right to die, it provides no guidance in a wide variety of situations where that right is asserted in a nonstatutory manner. Second, it appears that sections of the Act limiting the right to refuse treatment when the patient is pregnant may violate the
United States Constitution. Third, in its use of a standard form,
and in its failure to define key terms included therein, the Act
deprives the patient of flexibility in asserting his wishes, and
places an inordinate amount of discretion in the hands of the
attending physician, who must interpret the ambiguous terms in
the declaration. These problems will be the focus of the remainder of this section.
1. Nonstatutory Assertion of the Right to Die
Once enacted, a natural death statute may be viewed as a
patient's exclusive remedy if medical treatment is unwanted;
failure to follow the statutory guidelines may cause a patient's
wishes regarding treatment to go unheeded."' Some drafters
have attempted to preclude such a reading by stipulating in the
act that patients have "a fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care ...
and that "artificial prolongation of human life . . . may cause
loss of individual and personal dignity .... ,,"31 Express recognition of the fundamental nature of a patient's right to resist
treatment evidences a strong public policy in favor of rights beyond those recognized in the act. Some acts also provide that the
legislatively-created right to prepare a declaration is cumulative
with other rights of a patient. 137 This alerts the parties to addi134 See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 144-45 ("natural death acts may
restrict patients' ability to have their wishes about life-sustaining treatment respected").
"' See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-2 (1975)(discussing fundamental right of adults to
control medical decisions); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,101 (same).
131 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (discussing artificial prolongation
of life); Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures, 1985 La. Sess. Law Serv.
Act No. 187 (West)(to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1(B))(same).
137See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7193 (stating that Act does not supersede other legal rights or responsibilities individual has in withdrawing life-support system); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.10(C)(stating that Act is cumulative with existing
rights of consent or nonconsent to surgical treatment).
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tional statutory or constitutional rights.
Mississippi's Natural Death Act is silent on whether its provisions are exclusive or cumulative. This silence may create confusion in a number of situations. As discussed below,3 8 the Mississippi Act applies in few situations which will face health care
providers. Health care providers are far more likely to be faced
either with conscious patients without declarations who resist
treatment or with incompetent patients with noncomplying declarations or without declarations. Each situation is discussed in
a succeeding subsection of this article.
(i)

Competent Patients Without Declarations

Health care providers may be faced with competent patients
who resist treatment in several contexts. A number of situations
are worthy of discussion: for example, conscious patients near
death, for whom treatment merely prolongs dying;13 9 patients
suffering life-threatening conditions, like gangrenous extremities, who resist treatment which may permit them to resume a
sapient but impaired existence; 40 and patients suffering lifethreatening conditions which may be reversed entirely, but who
resist treatment on religious grounds.' 41 For purposes of analysis, it is to be assumed that the patient has not complied with
section 41-41-113 of Mississippi's Natural Death Act.' 4" These
cases present courts and health care providers with some of the
most difficult moral dilemmas.' 43 Due to the Act's silence as to
,38 See infra notes 229-36 and accompanying text.
,3' See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(fully
aware patient wishing respirator to be removed), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
140 See, e.g.,
Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233
(1978)(elderly widow refused to consent to amputation of her leg); In re Quackenbush,
156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785, 786 (1978)(elderly patient refused to consent to amputation of both legs).
141 See,
e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir.)(patient unwilling to consent to blood transfusion on religious grounds), reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Osborne, 294
A.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(same); In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435
(1965)(same).
142 See Miss. CoDE ANN. § 41-41-113 (discussing requirements for withdrawal
of lifesustaining mechanisms).
143 See Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 243, 249-50 (1977)(comparing sanctity of life with patient's
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the existence of additional rights, it must be observed from the
outset that Mississippi's Natural Death Act is of no legal significance in resolving these cases.
As recognized by one court, "[t]he right of a person to control his own body is a basic societal concept, long recognized in
the common law."144 Early precedent was not on all fours with
the situations posed above. That is, the cases did not involve
refusal to submit to treatment. Instead, they centered on other
issues, such as whether a physician committed a battery when he
treated a patient without securing an informed consent 145 or
whether a court could order a litigant to undergo a medical examination. 146 Some early cases contained strong dicta recognizing the individual's right of self-determination. 4 7 Courts sometimes balked at giving effect to that right, however, as in cases of
1 48
Jehovah's Witnesses who resisted blood transfusions.
Since the mid-1970's, courts have uniformly recognized a
nonstatutory right to refuse medical treatment.1 4 9 Roe v.
choice to resist medical treatment).
114 In
re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985).
141 See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 516, 104 N.W. 12, 16
(1905)(surgeon performing operation committed technical battery where operation was performed without
patient's consent, even though surgery was successful); Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)(surgeon who performs operation without patient's consent commits assault and is liable for damages).
1"6 See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)(discussing an individual's right to control his person).
...See, e.g., id. at 251: "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."
I40 See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1001-02 (D.C.
Cir.)(order authorizing blood transfusions by hospital to nonconsenting Jehovah's Witness held proper), reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670, 673
(1971)(holding that blood transfusion to Jehovah's Witness was proper and stating that
there is no constitutional right to choose to die)(overruled in In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,
486 A.2d 1209, 1224, regarding statement of constitutional right to die). See generally
Paris, Compulsory Medical Treatment and Religious Freedom: Whose Law Shall Prevail?, 10 U.S.F.L. REv. 1, 1 (1975)(contending that most court-ordered blood transfusions
to Jehovah's Witnesses are not constitutionally sound when dealing with competent
adult patients).
"' See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1345-47 (Del.
1980)(husband of comatose wife allowed to assert her right to privacy and apply for removal of her life-sustaining supports); John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d
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Wade,'5 0 which recognized a woman's constitutional right to privacy encompassing the right to abort her fetus, gave impetus to
courts finding in favor of a right to refuse medical treatment.
Even before the widely publicized Quinlan case, a Pennsylvania
common pleas court found, in reliance on Roe, that a competent
patient has a right to refuse to submit to a mastectomy even
though death might result from nontreatment. 15 1 Quinlan found
a similar right despite the patient's incompetence to assert the
right on her own behalf.'5 2 Following Quinlan's lead, every court
but one faced with the issue has found the right to refuse medical treatment to be of constitutional origin. 53 The United States

921, 923-24 (Fla. 1984)(terminally ill incompetent patient has same right to refuse treatment as terminally ill competent person); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 163-64 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(competent adult patient had right to refuse or discontinue treatment based on constitutional right of privacy), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re
Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115, 117 (1980)(request by wife and son of incompetent patient to terminate life-sustaining hemodialysis treatment); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 422 (1977)(stating that all persons, competent or incompetent, have right to refuse medical treatment in
appropriate circumstances); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (individual's
right to privacy to discontinue life-support systems increases as prognosis of recovery
dims), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383
A.2d 785, 789 (1978)(state's interest in preservation of life inferior to patient's privacy
right); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274 (guardian
allowed to terminate respirator of incompetent patient who, prior to incompetency, had
requested not to have his life prolonged), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Colyer,
99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983)(allowing discontinuance of life-sustaining systems to incompetent patient in chronic vegetative state).
'50 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"' In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 623-24 (C.P. Northampton County 1973)(Roe
guaranteed competent adult right to die barring any substantial interest of state in protecting third parties).
152 Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del.
1980)(husband had standing to assert constitutional rights of comatose wife); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(recognizing patient's right to
refuse or discontinue treatment based on constitutional right of privacy), aff'd, 379 So.
2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233
(1978)(discussing constitutional right to privacy); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center,
68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (C.P. 1980)(same); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114,
660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983)(stating that constitutional right of privacy of terminally ill
adult encompasses right to refuse treatment that serves only to prolong dying process,
absent countervailing state interests). The New York Court of Appeals found a right to
refuse medical treatment, but based that right on the common law, allowing more room
for the legislature to regulate the subject. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d
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Supreme Court, however, has not addressed this issue. 16 4 Therefore, state and lower federal courts are still free to reject a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, although in light of
almost unanimous support it is probable that the Supreme
Court would recognize this right.
Another basis for the right to refuse medical treatment may
be implied from the doctrine of informed consent. Mississippi
has codified the common law of informed consent by passage of
the Medical Consent Act,155 which expressly recognizes an
adult's right to consent to lawful medical procedures.15 In addition, it allows an adult to consent on behalf of incompetent patients,1 57 largely tracking the common law. 58 By implication, the
statute recognizes a right to refuse treatment when the person
acts as a surrogate. 59 Importantly, the statute recognizes that
"nothing contained herein shall be construed to abridge any
right of an adult . . . to refuse such consent as to his own
person." '1 0
Whatever the source of the right, however, the right to refuse treatment is not absolute. That right has been overridden
when the state's interest is sufficiently compelling to outweigh
the patient's interest. Four important state interests commonly
cited by courts and commentators as limiting the right of a person to refuse medical treatment are "preserving life, preventing
suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession, and

64, 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-73, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
'" See Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455-56
(D.D.C. 1985)(first federal court recognizing right of competent adult to refuse treatment); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-73 (Supreme Court repeatedly declined to consider constitutional right-to-die issue), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 764
(2d ed. 1983)(Supreme Court has not determined whether individual has constitutional
right to forego life-sustaining treatment).
"s
See Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (Supp. 1984)(medical consent statute).
'"
Id. § 41-41-3(a).
M Id. § 41-41-3(b), (d), (e), (f),
(j).
118 See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 115-18 (W.P. Keeton 5th ed.
1984)(discussing effect of incapacity and agency on consent).
'5,
Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3(k). The Act does not specify that one may refuse to
consent, but states that one may not withhold consent without justification. Id.
160 Id. (emphasis added).
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protecting innocent third parties."''
Without more, preservation of human life has not been held a sufficiently compelling
state interest to override the patient's decision."' 2 Were it otherwise, the state could compel any life-prolonging treatment, no
matter how marginal the benefit to the patient.
While courts have not drawn bright lines to determine what
constitutes a compelling state interest, a court is more likely to
honor a patient's decision where the treatment will only delay
death6 3 or where the medical procedure will leave the person
seriously impaired, and less likely to honor that decision where
the objectionable treatment will restore the person to full physical health. As observed by one court, "the State's interest weakens and the right of privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims, until the ultimate point
when the individual's rights overcome the State's interest in preserving life."' 6 4
These principles have generally been applied consistently by
the courts when competent patients refuse medical treatment.
There is universal agreement that a patient for whom treatment
6 5 The state's intermerely prolongs dying may resist treatment."
est in preserving life weakens as the prognosis for the patient's
cure dims. 66 The state's interest in safeguarding the integrity of
the medical profession is minimal in such cases.6 7 Most of the
16, In

re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985); see also Commissioner of

Corrections v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456, 457 (1979)(listing these countervailing state interests and discussing governmental interests in medical treatment in a
prison setting).
162 See, e.g., In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785, 789
(1978)(state's interest gave way to patient's right of privacy under particular facts of
case).
163 See, e.g.,
Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 161-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978)(competent and terminally ill adult allowed to discontinue medical treatment),
aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
16 In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (1978)(quoting In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976)).
165 Even advocates of aggressive treatment for seriously ill newborns recognize that
treatment may be withdrawn if treatment merely prolongs dying. See, e.g., Robertson,
Involuntary Euthanasiaof Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213,
237 (1975)(stating that medical procedures are not required where there is no reasonable
prospect of substantially prolonging child's life).
166 In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (1978).
i67See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224-25 (1985)(medical ethics do
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litigated cases have involved older patients without dependents. 168 Even if dependents are present, however, their interest
in brief prolongation of a patient's life is relatively slight; if
death is imminent even with treatment, they can look forward
neither to continued support nor to parental nurturing.
The case of the patient who resists surgical removal of a
gangrenous extremity is more difficult. Unlike the patient for
whom treatment merely prolongs dying, a patient whose death is
imminent because of a gangrenous condition may live for a substantial period if surgery is ordered.16 9 This brightened prognosis
suggests a heightening of the state's interest in protection of life.
Nevertheless, courts faced with such a nonconsenting patient
have acquiesced in the patient's decision.170 Those patients have
been old and have found life as an invalid meaningless.17' Courts
have justified refusal to intervene because the degree of bodily
72
invasion was great.'
The Jehovah's Witness cases also reflect this analysis,' 7 although the cases are more complex than those discussed above.
In the litigated cases, death would result without the transfusion

not require medical intervention at all costs); see also Mannes, Euthanasiavs. the Right
to Life, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 68, 69 (1975)(quoting Francis Bacon's statement that physician's duty includes allowing patient "to make a fair and easy passage").
'" See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(73year-old suffering from Lou Gehrig's disease), affd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1216 (1985)(84-year-old woman suffering from necrotic gangrenous ulcers and organic brain syndrome); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct.
377, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 (1978)(77-year-old widow suffering from gangrene in foot and
leg).
leg See, e.g., In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 F.2d 785, 787 (1978)(death
would almost certainly follow if surgery were not performed, but patient faced good
chance of recovery if treated).
17 See, e.g., id. at 787, 790 (patient allowed to refuse surgery even though death
might have been averted had operation been performed).
...See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233-35
(1978)(77-year-old widow who had been unhappy since husband's death and did not wish
to be burden on children).
'7' See, e.g.,
In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785, 789
(1978)(state's interest in preservation of life did not overcome extent of bodily invasion
suffered by patient).
73 See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.)(blood
transfusions ordered for nonconsenting patient who wanted to live, in order to preserve
status quo and because of risks to hospital), reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
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while full recovery was probable if the treatment were provided.17 4 Despite the excellent prognosis in such cases, courts
have not always ordered transfusions for nonconsenting Jeho75
vah's Witnesses.1
Allowing a patient to die in such cases has a superficial resemblance to suicide. The patient is consciously shortening his
life by some measurable period of time. 76 Courts, theologians,
and commentators, however, have distinguished the case of a suicide from that of a person who terminates treatment which provides no net benefit.177 Although not all of the attempted distinctions are persuasive, 78 it is now beyond serious debate that
the state's interest in suicide prevention does not compel treatment when "[r]efusing medical intervention merely allows the
disease to take its natural course .... "1179
Death of the patient who refuses removal of gangrenous tissue or of the Jehovah's Witness who refuses a life-saving blood
transfusion is harder to distinguish from suicide. Courts have
not always addressed this problem directly, relying for example
on an unpersuasive distinction between unwanted as opposed to
intended consequences of the refusal to accept treatment.8 o Ju17
See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1007 (D.C. Cir.
1964))(patient had better than 50% chance of recovery if treated).
"I See, e.g., In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965)(patient
allowed to refuse blood transfusions on religious grounds where doctor and hospital were
released from civil liability, no minor children were involved, and there was no threat to
social order).
170For example, in the law of homicide, any shortening of life constitutes murder, if
done deliberately. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 35, at 250
(1972)("causing death" usually involves the notion of shortening life).
177 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 665 (stating that removal of
life-supporting apparatus is not equivalant to suicide under particular circumstances),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); THE SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE
FAITH, DECLARATION ON EUTHANASIA 7 (Vatican City, May 5, 1980)(stating that "right to
die" does not mean right to procure death, but rather means right to die peacefully and
with dignity).
178 For example, some courts have relied on a distinction between the desire to die
and the lack of a specific intent to die. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209,
1224 (1985)(intent was not to die but to control manner of concluding life). That distinction has been effectively rebutted elsewhere. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at
77-82 (discussing "intended" and "unintended but foreseeable" consequences).
I In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (1985).
'80See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir.
1964)(court raised issue whether patient's death might be considered suicide, and, there-
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dicial unwillingness to confront the fact that they may be sanctioning suicide is understandable, given our society's hesitance
to endorse or to encourage suicide. 1 ' The case law demonstrates, however, that even if those deaths are technically suicide, the patient's right to privacy is sufficiently compelling to
prevent state intervention in those narrow circumstances."' Furthermore, the constitutional nature of the patient's right prevents the state from prosecuting family members and health
8 3
care providers for aiding and abetting a suicide.1
In sum, the analysis commonly applied where competent
patients who have not executed living wills resist life-saving
medical treatment is as follows: the patient has a right to refuse
treatment; death following refusal is not suicide, but the patient's will must be expressed unequivocally and can be overridden when necessary "to prevent the emotional and financial
abandonment of the patient's minor children .... "I"'
The law of Mississippi is consistent with the foregoing analysis. Section 41-41-3 recognizes the right of a competent adult to

fore, subject to criminal laws regulating suicide, but failed to resolve that issue because
patient's death would be unwanted consequence of following her religious scruples).
'"
See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977)(listing suicide prevention as compelling state interest).
See also Comment, Proposed State Euthanasia Statute: A Philosophical and Legal
Analysis, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 117 (1975)(suggesting that death by choice violates
principle of sanctity of life upon which our laws and society have been founded).
82 One commentator has distinguished cases like those discussed in the text from
suicides where state intervention may be appropriate: "A patient resisting medical treatment is not intent on repudiating life, but on avoiding a prolonged, undignified dying
process or on implementing a philosophical or religious conviction. There is no assault on
the body or active destruction of life; natural processes are simply allowed to run their
course without artificial disruption." Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 249-50 (1977). Elsewhere, Professor
Cantor has observed that psychiatric illness or mental disorder is a factor in 94 % of all
suicide attempts. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 256
n.142 (1973). These factors are not usually present in Jehovah's Witness cases where the
patient's right to refuse treatment has been upheld. See Paris, Compulsory Medical
Treatment and Religious Freedom: Whose Law Shall Prevail? 10 U.S.F.L. REV. 1, 23
n.139 (1975).
183 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 670 (1976)(stating
that third
parties whose actions effectuate individual's right of privacy are constitutionally
protected).
184 In
re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (1985).
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resist treatment. 185 The person's refusal may be overridden,
however, if the patient is (1) a man whose wife is pregnant,' (2)
a woman who is pregnant, 8 7 or (3) a person who is "the parent
of a minor living child."1 8 Those instances reflect the state's interest in preventing abandonment of innocent third parties." 9
Thus, despite the Natural Death Act's silence regarding alternative bases for a right to die, health care providers should continue to honor a conscious competent patient's refusal to accept
treatment absent a compelling reason to override that decision.
(ii)

Incompetent Patients with Noncomplying Declarations

One of the most controversial aspects of Mississippi's Natural Death Act is the requirement that a person file his declaration with the Bureau of Vital Statistics. 90 The first problem is
that few people will be aware of that requirement. Many people
secure living wills from national organizations, and execute them
without knowledge of local law.' 91 Undoubtedly, many Mississippians have done so. However, Mississippi's filing requirement is
unique. 192 Even within the state, it would appear that the filing
requirement has not been widely publicized. 9 3 Thus, it is proba-

185

MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (medical consent statute).

186 Id.
187

Id.

188 Id.

'89 Presumably, the Act does not require the parent of a minor child to accept all
therapies. Although the point is not entirely clear, he presumably could resist treatment
on the same grounds as he could if acting as a surrogate. That is, he might be allowed to
decline treatment if his decision were not arbitrary, obstinate, or without medical justification, the presence of a minor child notwithstanding.
180 Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-107(2).
'9'
See COMMISSION REPORT supra note 1, at 139-47 (discussing promulgation of living wills).
192 See supra note 26. The only similar provision is found in the North Carolina Act.
It requires a declaration to be certified by a notary public or clerk or assistant clerk of a
county superior court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(c)(4), (d)(3). The North Carolina Act is
more flexible than that of Mississippi, however. For example, the North Carolina Act
provides for procedures in cases where the patient has not executed a declaration. Id. §
90-322.
"I On February 12, 1985, this writer gave a short presentation on Mississippi's Natural Death Act to a county bar association in north Mississippi. An informal survey was
conducted, with 22 attorneys responding. The first question stated: "Your client is a
physician confronted by a patient with end-stage kidney disease who wishes to be with-
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ble that many more people execute noncomplying than complying documents.
Patients may become aware of the filing requirement in a
health care setting. If a person is competent and faced with a
terminal illness, it is possible that health care providers will instruct the person about the requirements of Mississippi's law.
However, unless properly trained in dealing with dying patients,
health care personnel may give the appearance of overreaching.""4 Further, some of those patients, even if competent, may
be physically unable to execute a declaration.196 Even if the requirement is communicated to some patients, a question remains whether the filing requirement is worth the limited benefits to patients and health care providers.
Having the document available through a state agency does
offer some benefits. Clearly, a patient already incompetent when
admitted to the hospital will benefit by the rule. Unless on file,
his declaration might not come to the attention of the treating
physician. It is also possible that family members unsympathetic
to a patient's desire to die might withhold that instrument if it
were not on file. Furthermore, the filing requirement may deter

drawn from hemodialysis. Advise the hospital." The second question was as follows:
"You represent a hospital where a patient in a persistently vegetative state is being kept
alive by a respirator. The family requests that the treatment be terminated. Advise the
hospital." Although the answers indicated an understanding of the general problem, only
three mentioned that there is a filing requirement for a declaration. Obviously, if faced
with the problem, those attorneys would have reviewed the Act. Nevertheless, if 86% of
a group of attorneys is unaware of the filing requirement, it is probable that an even
smaller group of the general population is aware of that requirement.
The State Board of Health has printed a form, including a declaration tracking the
statute and instructing the user of the filing requirement. However, the utility of that
form will depend on public awareness in the first instance.
'" See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 57-60 (discussing need for educational
reform to train health care providers to deal with dying patient, and stating that "many
professionals tend to avoid dying patients"). A number of statutes recognize the problem
of overreaching in the nursing home setting and provide for, in effect, an ombudsman to
oversee execution of a declaration by patients in nursing homes. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7188.5. See also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985)(recognizing need for special protection and procedures for those in nursing homes).
' In the context of revocation, that contingency was recognized in Mississippi's
Natural Death Act. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-109(3)(providing for revocation, oral or
otherwise, for patients unable to execute formal revocation). However, the problem of
executing a declaration in the first place may still exist.
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a person's efforts to forge a declaration. 6 Of course, one contemplating such a course of action is far more likely to be deterred by that section of the Act which provides for a twentyyear term of imprisonment for anyone who hastens the death of
another. 9 ' In addition, the witness requirement makes forgery
even more unlikely.
While the filing requirement may provide certain benefits, it
may also prove a barrier to the effectuation of a patient's desires
concerning medical treatment. A hospital is likely to be confronted far more frequently by patients without properly filed
documents than by those who have filed in accordance with the
Act.'9 8 For example, a patient admitted to the hospital may have
made a declaration substantially in compliance with the Act, but
which has not been filed. 199 The health care provider must decide whether to give any effect to that statement of the patient's
wishes. If the unfiled declaration is not legally binding on the
physician, the patient's right to refuse medical treatment is effectively nullified.
Initially, some jurisdictions address that problem by specific
provision or by implication. For example, California provides
that the document is evidence of the patient's desires but is not
controlling on that question.20 0 Some states provide specifically
that the right to execute a formal declaration created by a natural death act is cumulative with other rights, 20 1 rather than the
exclusive way in which to refuse unwanted treatment. Thus it
might be argued that any reliable expression of a person's decision about treatment ought to be honored.
Mississippi's Natural Death Act is silent on what legal effect
is to be given a noncomplying document. Mississippi does recognize a general right of a competent patient to refuse consent on
his own behalf or on behalf of an incompetent patient under cer-

"" The false filing of the document may also constitute separate additional crimes
to that provided in the Act. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-21-51 (1972)(forgery).
MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-121.
198 See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
'"
See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984)(stating that living will would be persuasive evidence of person's intention).
200 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(c).
201 See supra note 137.
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tain circumstances.2 2 Those provisions do not suggest how a decision is to be made for the incompetent patient, 0 3 or whether
the noncomplying living will has legal force. The failure to resolve that dilemma will undoubtedly cause indecision on the
part of health care providers. As indicated previously, clear legislation allows patients and health care providers to base a
course of treatment on consultation rather than litigation.0 4
Faced with Mississippi's Natural Death Act, counsel for Mississippi's hospitals, nurses, and doctors will find advising clients
difficult. Counsel must guess whether a physician's conduct may
be found criminal or unprofessional if he follows a noncomplying
declaration.20 5 Unfortunately, in an area where clear legal answers are necessary, there is no definitive answer. This writer
believes that the patient has a right to refuse treatment independent of the statute and that, as a general matter, the health
care provider should accept the patient's assertion of his right
whenever that expression is unambiguous.
As discussed above, there is substantial agreement that a
person has a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment.0 6
Interestingly, most of the decisions governing refusal of treatment have involved incompetent patients.20 7 While Quinlan is
frequently cited as the leading case on a competent patient's
right to terminate treatment, it involved a persistently vegetative patient whose life was apparently being sustained by a respirator. 20 8 However, once a court recognizes that a competent
patient has a constitutional right to refuse treatment, it does not
necessarily follow that a patient will exercise that right. 0 9 Ino MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3.
, See infra notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 4-16 and accompanying text.
205 In theory, any shortening of the life of another is homicide. See W. LAFAVE & A.
'

ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 35, at 250 (1972)("one who hastens the victim's

death is a cause of his death").
'00 See supra notes 139-84 and accompanying text.
207 For a list of cases involving the treatment of incompetent patients, see notes 23134.
.0.355 A.2d 647.
200 See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 154, at 764 ("it is important

that courts and legislators clearly separate the question of whether an individual should
have the right to forego medical treatment from the question of whether other persons
can determine when life-support or life-saving techniques need not be employed to con-
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deed, probably as often as patients decide to terminate treatment, other patients pursue painful therapies with little chance
of recovery.21 0 It is unclear, therefore, how an incompetent patient, absent an advance directive, might exercise the right to
refuse treatment. As observed by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, an "affirmation of [a comatose patient's] independent
right of choice . . . would ordinarily be based upon her competency to assert it."2 1'
Persistently vegetative patients have virtually no chance of
recovery, 1 2 but they may 'live" for prolonged periods of time.2 1 3
Thus, continued treatment would appear to be a poor use of limited medical resources. Termination of treatment based only on
social utility, however, is certainly a form of euthanasia. 1 4 While
euthanasia may be morally defensible in some cases,215 no court
or legislature in the United States has been willing to adopt that
view."' That problem-permitting termination of treatment
which offers no benefit to the patient without endorsing a form
of euthanasia-was resolved in Quinlan by resort to the substituted judgment test: "The only practical way to prevent destruc-

tinue an individual's existence").
20 See Kamisar, supra note 130, at 8-12 (many terminally ill patients choose lifesustaining treatment).
2ll Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
"1
See COMMISsION REPORT, supra note 1, at 181-82 (stating that "[d]isability is
total and no return to an even minimal level of social or human functioning is possible"
where diagnosis of permanent unconsciousness is correct).
213 See, e.g., Field & Romanus, A Decerebrate Patient:Eighteen Years of Care, 45
CONN. MED. 717 (1981)(summarizing 18 years of medical treatment of decerebrate
quadraplegic patient). Karen Ann Quinlan remained alive until June 11, 1985, even
though she was weaned from the respirator. See Living Wills Gain Acceptance, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 20, 1984, at § C9, col. 3.
214 See Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing"
Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 1042 (1958)("euthanasia program may only be the
wedge for far more objectionable practices").
21 See D. MAGUIRE, DEATH BY CHoIcE 78 (1974)(stating that choosing death in some
instances may be "truly human and moral").
2'6 Courts and legislatures have specifically disclaimed that they are authorizing euthanasia. See, e.g., Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 658 (discussing amicus brief distinguishing termination of extraordinary treatment from euthanasia); ALA. CODE § 22-8A-10
(1975)("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, authorize or approve
mercy killing..."); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7195 (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
ch. 25 (revisor's notes, quoting § 3 of Del. Laws, c. 386)(same); D.C. CODE ANN, § 6-2430
(West Supp. 1985)(same).
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tion of [her] right is to permit the guardian and family of Karen
to render their best judgment" as to her choice concerning continued treatment.2 1 7 Once the patient's putative choice is known,
death following withdrawal of treatment cannot be construed as
involuntary euthanasia. Of course, this dilemma is less troubling
if a patient has prepared an advance directive.
It might be argued that Mississippi's Natural Death Act
only regulates procedures whereby a patient's constitutional
right may be exercised. 1 8 It is well settled that states have an
interest in establishing such procedures even though they may
at times adversely affect the exercise of federal rights. 21 9 At least
in the abortion context, however, privacy is a fundamental right
and state regulation is subject to the strict scrutiny test. 220 Thus,
the Supreme Court has held invalid state procedures which have
unduly burdened a woman's right to secure an abortion. 221 Elsewhere, the Court has held that even when the state regulates an
area in which it has a legitimate interest, it cannot do so "by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose. "222
Given that no other jurisdiction has restricted the exercise
of a patient's right to make a declaration by a requirement of
formal filing, 23 it is difficult to argue that Mississippi has used
217
2

Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.

8 For an argument that the Act is ambiguous concerning the treatments which

may be resisted, see notes 284-306 and accompanying text.
219 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965)(state must have legitimate interest
in its procedural rules if litigant's procedural default prevents vindication of federal
right); Tileston v. Ulman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943)(state court's consistent practice of declining to answer questions not reserved prevented Supreme Court review).
220 Roe v. Wade, 413 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 154, at 745 (state must show compelling interest).
22, See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192-201 (1973)(law requiring performance
of abortions in hospital, interposition of hospital committee, confirmation of other physicians, and limiting abortion to Georgia residents, held unconstitutional). See also City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)(holding that state
regulation of abortion must be supported by compelling state interest); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976)(spousal consent provision and blanket
parental consent requirement for minors held unconstitutional).
212 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
223 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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the least restrictive means to achieve its purpose in protecting
patients' lives. As noted above, the requirement, in part, aids a
patient to assert the right to refuse treatment. 2 4 This justification, however, does not lead to the conclusion that unfiled documents or oral declarations should be invalid. The state unquestionably has an interest in preventing the forgery of a
declaration, but even without the filing requirement the Mississippi Act includes ample protection against that fairly remote
possibility. The Act requires the signatures of two witnesses who
can gain nothing from the declarant's death and who must know
the declarant personally.2 25 Further, the false filing may be a
criminal act; if so, the false-filer would be subject to a twentyyear sentence for forging the declaration, 22 as well as to the
lesser penalty for general forgery. 227 The filing requirement adds
little, if anything, to this deterrent scheme.
Thus, health care providers should give legal effect to a patient's noncomplying advance directive if evidence exists that it
reflects the patient's actual preference. If the Act is read as the
exclusive procedure whereby a patient may assert his right to
terminate treatment by advance directive, it almost certainly
228
conflicts with the patient's constitutional right to privacy.
(iii)

Incompetent Patients with No Declaration

Many jurisdictions have failed to enact procedures governing withdrawal of treatment from incompetent patients who
have not executed declarations.2 29 That has been a source of
criticism of those acts.2 30 Mississippi's Act similarly fails to ad-

224

225
226
227

See supra text accompanying notes 196-97.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-107.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-121.
See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-21-33 (providing maximum 15-year term of im-

prisonment for forgery).
228 Counsel
for health care providers should keep in mind that what is really at
stake is whether the physician will get a good faith immunity. The Act provides only
that hastening the death of another by forging a declaration or by destroying a revocation is a criminal act. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-21.
229 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1975); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
7185-7195; D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101
to -28,109.
220 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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dress the problem of decision-making for incompetents. Further,
its medical consent law is ambiguous.
Insofar as legislation should clarify patients' and health care
providers' rights without recourse to litigation, the Act's silence
on the issue is a glaring failure. Treatment decisions on behalf of
seriously ill newborns2 3' and retarded,2 32 senile, 33 or comatose
patients 234 who have not executed declarations raise the most

231

See, e.g., Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187,

469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (child born with spinal bifida and complicating disorders), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 560 (1983). For a discussion of some of the moral problems raised by such
cases, see generally P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE (1978)(discussing medical
and legal intersections at the beginning and ending of life); Defective Newborns, supra
note 11, at 244-61 (discussing issues raised by withholding medical treatment from ill
infants). See also Vitiello, The Baby Jane Doe Litigation and Section 504: An Exercise
in Raw Executive Power, 17 CONN. L. REV. 95, 102-04 (1984)(discussing severely impaired
newborn).
232 See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 419 (1977)(mentally retarded adult suffering from leukemia); In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 66, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270-71 (mentally retarded
and terminally ill adult cancer patient), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). For an analysis
of Saikewicz, see Baron, Assuring "Detached but Passionate Investigation and Decision": The Role of Guardians Ad Litem in Saikewicz-type Cases, reprinted in LEGAL
AND ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra note 9, at 114.
223 See, e.g., In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115, 118 (1980)(adult with
chronic organic brain syndrome suffering from end-stage kidney disease); In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1216 (1985)(incompetent elderly patient). For some problems
raised by the Spring case, see Glantz, The Case of Earle Spring: Terminating Treatment on the Senile, reprinted in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra note 9, at 173;
Dunn & Ator, Vox Clamantis in Deserto: Do You Really Mean What You Say in
Spring?, id. at 177.
234 See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493
(1983)(discontinuance of treatment of comatose patient not unlawful); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del. 1980)(husband of comatose wife had
standing to apply for court order authorizing removal of life-sustaining supports); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 651 (parent seeking discontinuance of extraordinary
treatment for 21-year-old daughter in persistent vegetative state), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809, 81011 (C.P. 1980)(authorizing guardian to disconnect respirator from patient in vegetative
state); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738, 740 (1983)(same). For a discussion of
the moral problem raised by withdrawal of artificial feeding devices in such cases, see
Capron, Ironies and Tensions in Feeding the Dying, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. No. 5, at
32-35 (Oct. 1984)(comparing denial of nutrition to dying patients with denial of other
medical treatment); Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and
Water?, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. No. 5, at 18 (Oct. 1983)(justifying withholding food
and water from comatose patients). See also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209,
1227-28 (1985)(discussing withdrawal of treatment from comatose patients).
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difficult moral questions.23 5 Moreover, cases in which patients
have executed living wills are rare.2 Thus a statute dealing only
with formal declarations addresses only a fraction of the problem. Counsel for health care providers will probably advise their
clients to continue treatment in such cases absent clear authorization for its withdrawal.2 3 This is unfortunate, because the
weight of authority permits withdrawal of treatment in such
cases.
As stated above, most of the litigated cases have involved
withdrawal of treatment from incompetent patients.2 38 Those
cases have recognized a right to refuse treatment which survives
the ability of the patient to assert the right on his own behalf.
As stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Quinlan, "[t]he
only practical way to prevent destruction of [her] right is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment" as to her choice concerning continued treatment. 239 This
standard is not without difficulty. A person may not have expressed views from which his choice may be inferred. 40 More
difficult questions arise when the incompetent patient has never
2 41
been able to form values or to understand such questions.
Nevertheless, a majority of courts faced with the problem have
2 42
followed Quinlan on this point.

See Kamisar, supra note 130 (raising moral questions about Quinlan decision).
John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) is the first
appellate decision giving legal effect to such a document.
137 See, e.g., Liacos, Dilemmas of Dying, reprinted in LEGAL AND ETHIcAL ASPECTS,
supra note 9, at 149, 153 (characterizing confusion caused by Saikewicz decision as "an
example not only of an abundance of caution but of hysteria on the part of legal counsel
who advised hospitals that such extreme measures needed to be taken in order to protect
the hospital and the medical staff"). See also Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz:
Decision Making for the Terminally Ill Incompetent, id. at 28, 39-42 (suggesting that
court and counsel must share blame for confusion caused by Saikewicz case).
"' See supra notes 229-36 and accompanying text.
13, 355 A.2d at 664.
240 See Kamisar, supra note 130, at 5-7 (arguing that Karen Ann Quinlan's guardian
'3

would have no information on which to base his judgment concerning her putative
choice). But see Vitiello, supra note 231, at 128 (arguing that person's choice may be
inferred from his values and goals, in absence of explicit statement of his choice).
,2' See Vitiello, supra note 231, at 128-30 (discussing instances in which decisionmakers will have no basis from which to infer patient's choice).
241 See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del.
1980)(husband of comatose wife had standing to apply for removal of her life-sustaining
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Legislation in this area is often most appropriate. For example, absent legislative guidance, the New Jersey Supreme Court
established procedures whereby future cases might be resolved
without constant resort to litigation. 4 3 The court's reliance on
hospital ethics committees has proven the most controversial aspect of the Quinlan case, subjecting the court to the criticism
that it usurped the legislature's role.244 The absence of hearings
and input of concerned parties that would be available to a legislature may explain the confusion concerning the role of the ethics committee ordained by the court.2 4 5
Even if an incompetent has a constitutional right to be
withdrawn from certain treatments, there are numerous procedural questions rightly decided by the legislature. These questions include, for example, the following: Who should serve as
the incompetent's surrogate? How should disputes be resolved if
family members disagree among themselves or with health care
providers on a course of treatment? How many doctors should
certify the patient's prognosis?""

supports); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809, 810
(C.P. 1980)(discussing husband's motion to terminate respirator of wife who was in
chronic vegetative state); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738, 751 (1983)(guardian able to exercise incompetent's personal right to refuse life-sustaining treatment in
appropriate circumstances). See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 194-96 (discussing role of guardian in cases comparable to Quinlan).
243 Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671. The court stated the following:
Upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen, should the responsible attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possibility of
Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state and that the life-support apparatus now being administered to
Karen should be discontinued, they shall consult with the hospital "Ethics
Committee" or like body of the institution in which Karen is then hospitalized.
If that consultative body agrees that there is no reasonable possibility of
Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support system may be withdrawn ....
Id.
244 See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434 (1977)(rejecting Quinlan approach of entrusting decision
whether to continue artificial life support to guardian, family, attending physician, and
hospital "ethics committee"); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (emphasizing that court's role is limited to redressing issues raised by
facts of case), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
See Annas, supra note 237, at 49.
'4
See, e.g., Declarations Concerning Life-sustaining Procedures, 1985 La. Sess.
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Mississippi already provides limited legislative guidance in
this area. Section 41-41-3 provides that a person may consent to
medical treatment on behalf of others under certain circum2 4 For example, an adult may consent if treatment is
stances.
needed for his minor child;24 8 for his spouse if she is of unsound
mind;24 9 or for another person for whom he stands in loco
parentis.25 0 By implication, the Act allows the person to refuse
consent. A court may override that refusal to consent when the
person has refused "arbitrarily, obstinately or without reasonable medical justification .
"251
Section 41-41-3 was not designed to resolve complex
problems created by currently available medical technology that
perhaps may sustain an unconscious patient indefinitely.2 52 Instead, the Medical Consent Act reflects the need to free health
care professionals from concern about being sued for assault and
battery when the proper consenting party was not immediately
available.2 53 The Act is an inadequate substitute for a carefully
drafted statute intended to address treatment for comatose patients. For example, the Act does not suggest how a surrogate is
to decide whether to consent to treatment. While the Act does
provide that a decision-maker may not withhold consent arbitrarily, it does not allow a surrogate to take account of the patient's actual preferences 2M It does not indicate whether a phy255
sician's prognosis must be confirmed by his colleagues.
Law Serv. Act No. 187 (West)(to be codified at LA.REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5)(establishing procedures in absence of a declaration); id. (to be codified at LA.REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.58.6)(establishing procedures in cases of terminally ill minors).
147 Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (medical consent statute).
248 Id. § 41-41-3(b).
249Id. § 41-41-3(d).
250Id. § 41-41-3(e).
'5 Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3. MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-9 permits a court to enter
an order compelling treatment in such cases, but does not specify the circumstances
under which such an order is proper.
252 See Field & Romanus, supra note 213 (decerebrate, quadraplegic patient sustained for 18 years).
253 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 158, at 115-21 (discussing torts of assault
and battery).
25 For a discussion of the requirement of substituted judgment, see In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-33 (1985)(discussing subjective and objective tests).
255Cf. Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedues, 1985 La. Sess. Law Serv.
Act No. 187 (West)(to be codified at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5)(procedures in
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Finally, it does not protect the decision-maker from suit even if
he exercises his judgment in good faith.2 56
This writer believes that the Mississippi legislature should
address the problem of adequate procedures for withdrawal of
treatment from incompetent patients. Recourse to the Medical
Consent Act is unsatisfactory because it does not require that
such decisions should be governed where possible by the unconscious patient's putative choice.
2.

Pregnancy

Several states, including Mississippi, provide that a declaration is invalid if the declarant is pregnant. 57 Mississippi's Act,
for example, provides that "if [a declarant] ha[s] been diagnosed
as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to [the attending] physician, this declaration shall have no force or effect during the
course of [the] pregnancy." ' 58 That prohibition would appear to
be mandatory in that the Act requires that a declaration "shall
be in substantially the [statutory] form," including the quoted
provision. 59 It would also appear to apply without regard to the
gravida's awareness of her pregnancy.
This provision raises a very interesting constitutional question. To illustrate the problem, one might hypothesize three different terminally ill patients: the first, a conscious woman in the
third trimester of her pregnancy; the second, a comatose woman
in an early stage of pregnancy; and the third, a conscious woman
who is also in an early stage of pregnancy. In each instance, it
should be assumed that the patient has complied with all other
provisions of the Act and was aware of her pregnancy when she
executed her declaration. As indicated above, the weight of authority is that there is a constitutional right to privacy, encom-

absence of declaration).
"" Cf. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-117 (exempting physician who acts in good faith and
in compliance with Mississippi's Natural Death Act from criminal prosecution or civil
liability).
"' See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188(3)(stating that directive is to have
no effect during course of pregnancy); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(d)(same); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103(a)(same); NEv. REV. STAT. § 449.610 (1979)(same).
268 MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-107(1).
259

Id.
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passing a right to refuse medical treatment.2 6 0 In the hypothetical cases, each patient has chosen to exercise that right by
executing a declaration to terminate unwanted treatment. The
problem, of course, is that termination of treatment has the unfortunate additional consequence of terminating the pregnancy.
If the statute prohibits exercise of a patient's privacy right
under all circumstances, it would be hard to reconcile with Roe
v. Wade2"1 and its progeny.20 Roe held that the right to privacy
"is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy," and that the right is fundamental. 6 The state's interest in the mother's health and life of
the fetus are not sufficiently compelling to prohibit abortion until the third trimester. During the third trimester, the state's interest in the viable fetus is sufficiently compelling to prohibit
abortions not necessary to protect the mother. 6 4 Some subsequent decisions have limited abortions, for example, by upholding Congress's withdrawal of funding for abortions 6" and by upholding a statute requiring that a minor's parents be notified
about her intention to have an abortion.26 6 However, the Court
has not abandoned a woman's fundamental right of choice free
from interference by the state, spouse, or physician.6 7
If section 41-41-107's prohibition is mandatory, it almost
certainly violates two separate privacy rights: freedom to terminate a pregnancy and freedom to refuse medical treatment. Roe
'

See supra notes 139-84 and accompanying text.

,T 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983)(abortion provisions requiring waiting period and parental consent for unmarried
minors under 15 held unconstitutional); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979)(abortion statute requiring consent of parents or court approval for unmarried women under
18 held unconstitutional); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-97 (1979)(statute basing liability on physician's determination of whether fetus is or may be viable is unconstitutionally vague); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976)(abortion
provision requiring spousal consent and blanket parental consent held unconstitutional).
U3 410 U.S. at 153.
24 Id. at 163-64.
See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983)(reaffirming Roe and emphasizing woman's right to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy).
"

"
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permits the state to regulate the decision of the gravida in the
third trimester. 268 A woman in an earlier stage of pregnancy,
however, who would undergo conscious suffering if compelled to
accept treatment, would appear to have at least as great a right
to terminate her pregnancy as would a woman not afflicted with
a terminal illness. It is inconceivable that the patient's illness
giving rise to the desire to terminate treatment would somehow
increase the state's interest in the life of the fetus.
The hardest case is that of the patient early in pregnancy
who becomes comatose after having expressed a desire to terminate treatment and after discovering that she is pregnant. Once
she is incapable of feeling pain and experiencing her environment, she would appear to be indifferent to termination of treatment. Although the interest of the fetus in its life would seem to
outweigh the patient's interest in being allowed to die,269 there
are competing interests. For example, the patient has an interest
before losing consciousness in knowing that her life will not be
prolonged by artificial means. This apprehension cannot be discounted. It has caused perhaps millions of people to execute living wills. 2 70 Additionally, in other contexts a patient's wishes are
not rendered inoperative simply because she no longer experiences pain or her environment. It would be unconscionable, for
example, to use that person's vital organs to benefit others absent her actual consent, or perhaps a "consent" based on the
substituted judgment of a surrogate decisionmaker.2 71 Forcing
the gravida to carry her fetus to term in such a case is to treat
her as a means, condemned almost universally by moralists.7 2
268 410 U.S. at 163-64.
269

Cf. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457,

459-60 (1981)(state supreme court affirmed order of lower court authorizing hospital to
perform caesarean section to deliver infant and to give nonconsenting mother, a Jehovah's Witness, blood transfusion). Jefferson does not establish a broad right of intervention in that the fetus had been carried to term.
270 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
171 See Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48, 52-78 (1976)(discussing ethical and legal problems
of transplanting organs from incompetent persons).
272 See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDIcAL
ETHICS 59, 62 (2d
ed. 1983)(stating that interference with one's autonomy violates right to selfgovernance).
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However that last case might be resolved, the legislature has
painted with too broad a brush. The prohibition against termination of treatment for a pregnant patient appears absolute.
The state may unquestionably regulate third trimester
pregnancies. It ought to be able regulate cases in which the patient is unaware that she is pregnant prior to losing consciousness on a reasonable presumption that a mother would choose to
give her fetus a chance for life in a situation in which little additional suffering is imposed upon her. It seems inconceivable,
however, in light of Roe v. Wade,27 3 that the state may compel a
patient in the early term of her pregnancy to carry the fetus to
term.
3.

The Standard Form and Extraordinary Treatment

Mississippi's Natural Death Act provides that a declarant
must substantially follow the form provided in section 41-41107.274 That form sets forth several requirements: the patient's
condition must be terminal; death must be imminent; and at
least three physicians must confirm that prognosis. If those conditions are met, life-sustaining mechanisms may be refused or
withdrawn. 7 5 This final step consists of the "cessation of use of
extraordinary techniques and applications, including mechanical
devices, which prolong life through artificial means. 2 7 6 Two distinct problems are raised by the standard form in section 41-41107. First, there is serious question about the wisdom of using
standard forms generally. Second, it is unclear what the concept
of "extraordinary techniques" encompasses.
(i)

Standard Forms: The Broad Brush

Section 41-41-107 requires that a person's declaration must
substantially follow the prescribed form. Mississippi is not alone
2
in that requirement.
213

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
§ 41-41-107(1).

214 Miss. CODE ANN.
21
'1

Id.
Id. § 41-41-103(b).
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAYETY

'
CODE § 7188 (stating that directive shall be
substantially in form given by statute); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (1984)(same); NEV. REV.
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As discussed above, the right to refuse treatment is based
on a constitutional right to privacy. Individuals demonstrate
different tolerance to pain. Some may choose not to exercise
their constitutional right at all. Others may choose to exercise it
to a greater or lesser extent. For example, one patient may not
resist the use of a respirator, but may want a "no-code

'279

en-

tered into his medical chart. Another patient might resist both
therapies.28 0 Critics of the standard form correctly argue that
such forms fail to account for individual preferences because
they discourage or forbid variation. Further, patients often learn
about these forms through the popular media. 81 One of the risks
of such easy access to a standard form is that it may be executed
without serious thought about the content of the form or proper
understanding of its language.
The President's Commission Report reflects these concerns.
It recommends that a person consult his physician prior to signing an advance directive.2 82 Further, it praises jurisdictions with

durable power of attorney provisions which are effective even after the person executing the document becomes incompetent
and which allow the agent to make medical decisions on behalf
of an incompetent principal. 28 3 These provisions may supple-

ment, not supplant, the right to execute a living will referring to
specific unwanted therapies.2 84 Additionally, a durable power of
§ 449.610 (1979)(same);

STAT.

OR. REV. STAT.

§ 97.055 (1983)(same).

See supra notes 139-84 and accompanying text.
279 A "no-code" order is an order placed in the record of a terminally ill patient that
"directs a hospital and its staff not to apply extraordinary intrusive resuscitative measures in the event of cardiac or respiratory failure." Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697,
434 N.E.2d 601, 602 n.1 (1982).
280 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 43-60 (discussing patients' decisions in
foregoing treatment).
28, For example, many people have learned about living wills from reading the syndicated column "Dear Abby." "Two columns [of 'Dear Abby' in 19831 resulted in a flood
of nearly 100,000 requests to the Society [for the Right to Die] for [living will
forms]-impressive testimony to the influence she has on her readers and to the public's
ever-increasing interest in the subject." Society for the Right to Die Newsletter, Spring
1984, at 5.
282 COuMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 153.
283 Id. at 145-47.
284 See, e.g., Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures, 1985 La. Sess.
'

Law Serv. Act No. 187 (West)(to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.58.3(C)(2))(providing that declaration may include designation of agent to make

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 54

attorney may make more probable serious reflection by the declarant. The declarant is more likely to discuss his preferences if
he appoints an agent than if he merely signs a standard form.
Thus, the agent's choice will be informed, leaving less need for
interpretation of the patient's actual preferences.28 5
Mississippi recently amended its power of attorney statute.
It now provides that "[t]he subsequent disability or incompetence of a principal shall not revoke or terminate the authority
of an attorney-in-fact who acts under a power of attorney in a
writing. . ." which demonstrates that the principal intended the
power to survive his incompetence. 28 6 The statute is silent, however, on whether the legislature intended to allow the agent to
make decisions affecting medical treatment. Given the Natural

Death Act's insistence on the use of a standard form and the
lack of recognition of additional rights of patients, it is doubtful
that the legislature intended to extend the power of attorney
provisions so far. This is unfortunate. Recent statutes from
other states have adopted that approach by allowing appointment of an agent and by making use of a standard form optional.287 Recourse to an agent appointed by the patient reflects
more clearly the patient's actual preferences than does recourse
to a standard form subject to interpretation by, for example, the
patient's physician or a court. Mississippi might easily amend its
act to provide similar flexibility.
(ii) Extraordinary Treatment
The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary care
has a well-established pedigree in medical ethics. At least as
early as 1957, the Catholic Church used that distinction to delineate situations in which patients and their families may morally

treatment decisions).
2s5

COMMISSION REPORT,

288

MIss.

281

supra note 1, at 153.

CODE ANN. § 87-3-13(3)(Supp. 1984).
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502(b)(allowing adult to appoint agent by

written declaration); Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures, 1985 La. Sess.
Law Serv. Act No. 187 (West)(to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.58.3(C)())(allowing variation from example form by permitting designation of
agent to make treatment decisions).
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reject available treatment.2 88 More recently, however, moral philosophers and theologians have recognized inherent ambiguity in
those terms and now prefer a distinction based on proportionate
benefits promised by the treatment in question.2 "9
The President's Commission summarized some of the meanings given to those terms:
The most natural understanding of the ordinary/extraordinary distinction is as the difference between common and unusual care ....

This interprets the distinction in a literal, sta-

tistical sense and, no doubt, is what some of its users intend.
Related, though different, is the idea that ordinary care is simple and that extraordinary care is complex, elaborate, or artificial, or that it employs elaborate technology and/or great efforts and expense. 9 '
A third interpretation of those terms focuses on the "usefulness or burdensomeness of a particular therapy."2 91 The Commission found that this third interpretation "does have moral
significance,"29 2 but rejected use of those terms because
"[c]larity and understanding in this area will be enhanced if
laws, judicial opinions, regulations, and medical policies speak
instead in terms of the proportionate benefit and burdens of
treatment as viewed by particular patients."2'93
Section 41-41-101 of Mississippi's Natural Death Act defines "life-sustaining mechanisms" as "extraordinary techniques
and applications, including mechanical devices, which prolong
life through artificial means."2 94 The statute does not further define "extraordinary techniques," thus permitting inconsistent interpretations. One permissible interpretation is that "extraordi""' See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 658 (discussing reliance on distinction made by Pope
Pius XII in his address on Nov. 24, 1957).
"' See, e.g., T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 272, at 126-36 (stating that
treatment decisions should be based on prospective benefit to patient). See also THE
SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON EUTHANASIA 9
(Vatican City, May 5, 1980)(permitting decision to refuse life-prolonging treatment
where death is imminent in spite of medical care).
290 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 84.
91 Id. at 88.
292

Id.

. Id. at 84.
294 MIss. CODE ANN.

§

41-41-103(b).
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nary" refers to the nature of the device. The statute refers to
techniques and applications, as well as to mechanisms. As
quoted above, the term may be used to mean "complex, elaborate or artificial or that it employs elaborate technology . . 295
The only indication that "extraordinary" has a broader
meaning is that the statute allows withdrawal of a patient with a
terminal condition, near death.2 9 Thus it allows withdrawal of
therapies that provide little net benefit to the patient. Therapies
other than complex ones, however, may also provide no net benefit. A frequent example is the denial of antibiotics to the comatose patient or to a person ravaged by cancer who contracts
pneumonia.2 97 Courts have frequently resorted to the ordinary/
extraordinary distinction. While they have not always agreed on
the meaning of this distinction,2 98 the results of these cases have
generally been consistent. They have permitted withdrawal of
persistently vegetative patients from respirators because the
treatment was "extraordinary. '299 Upon a determination of competence, the patients have been allowed to refuse surgical removal of gangrenous extremities. 0 0 Courts have not been consistent, however, in deciding whether artificial feeding devices are
ordinary or extraordinary devices.30 1 These cases require careful

295

COMMISSION REPORT,

supra note 1, at 87.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-113.
297 See Capron, supra note 234, at 34 (discussing decisions denying treatment to
terminally ill patients).
2198See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 83-87 (discussing various interpretations of distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treatment).
191See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1350 (Del.
1980)(allowing husband to remove life-support from comatose wife); In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647, 671-72 (allowing discontinuance of extraordinary procedures sustaining life of
noncognitive vegetative patient).
10 See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236
(1978)(competent 77-year-old widow allowed to refuse removal of gangrenous foot and
leg); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785, 790 (1978)(competent 72year-old patient allowed to refuse removal of gangrenous legs). Cf. Dept. of Human
Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197, 211-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978)(patient was found
incompetent to decide whether to submit to surgery; thus her refusal to consent could be
overriden if treatment was in her best interest).
3o
Two courts have held that withdrawal of artificial feeding devices was permissible under certain circumstances. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006,
1023, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (1983); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959,
964 (1984). One court rejected that view. See In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d
'
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analysis of the meaning of the distinction because withdrawal of
such devices will guarantee imminent death with a certainty not
necessarily present in other cases. 02
While courts have not always been forced to settle the precise meaning of the distinction,3 0 3 the decisions support the proportionate benefit distinction. For example, faced with a patient
who needed a respirator to survive an allergic response to a bee
sting, a court almost certainly would order treatment. It is almost inconceivable that the court would focus on the nature of
the device. Its discussion would almost certainly focus on the
patient's chance of full recovery. 0 Similarly, even though surgical removal of gangrenous extremities allows a patient a sapient
existence, patients who have successfully resisted such treatment
have been old and have expressed aversion to life as an invalid
and little interest in life itself.3 0 5 It is doubtful that courts would
reach a similar result if a young person were faced with the decision, with the prospect of physical and psychological therapy
that might permit a reasonably full life.30 6 These various results
are consistent not because of the therapy provided, but because
of the benefits of the therapy to the patient.
Focus on proportionate benefits is consistent with the constitutional analysis adopted by the courts. For example, patients
unable to form judgments about such medical decisions are enti-

303, 315 (1983). That decision, however, was recently reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1244 (1985).
302 For example, Karen Ann Quinlan was able to survive several years free from a
respirator, but was fed by artificial means. See Living Wills Gain Acceptance, supra
note 213. She would obviously have expired within days had the artificial feeding device
been terminated. For a discussion of this issue generally, see Capron, supra note 234.
sos See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 83-87 (discussing various interpretations given to ordinary/extraordinary distinction).
301 See In
re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1007 (D.C. Cir.)(court
considered prospect of patient's full recovery in decision to permit hospital to give patient blood transfusions over her refusal to consent), reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1978 (1964).
3oo See supra note 300.
3"
Compare Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1066 (1978), with
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417, 435 (1977). In one instance the court ordered treatment for a young child suffering
from acute lymphocytic leukemia; in the other, the court upheld a lower court order
refusing to order treatment for a 67-year-old severely retarded patient suffering from
acute myeloblastic leukemia. The chance of recovery was similar in the two cases.
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tled to be treated in a manner consistent with their best interests."'7 A patient's interest cannot be discovered by reference to
the nature of a medical device or a mechanism, but can be determined by analyzing the benefits which are promised by a particular treatment. Even a competent conscious patient who resists
treatment may have that decision overridden by a sufficiently
strong state interest.308 Cases in which treatment has been compelled suggest that the court in fact balances the benefit of
treatment to the patient. Further, courts have distinguished permissible refusal of treatment from suicide.30 9 That distinction
would seem to turn on the patient's prospects for full recovery if
treated. Thus, if a court or legislature uses the extraordinary/
ordinary treatment dichotomy, the dichotomy ought to be interpreted as referring to a balance of benefits that the treatment
provides a patient.
The Mississippi Act is ambiguous on the meaning of "extraordinary" care. It is hoped that "extraordinary" treatment
will be interpreted by reference to the proportionate benefits to
the patient.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

This article started from the premise that patients, health
307 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983)(blanket determination that abortions are not in best interests of minor absent
parental consent held unconstitutional); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979)(pregnant minor should be allowed to demonstrate that abortion is in her best interest where
parental consent is denied); Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601, 610
(1982)("no-code" order would serve best interests of infant suffering cyanotic heart
disease).
308 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977). One commentator has observed that such instances are rare. See
Brant, "Last Rights: An Analysis of Refusal and Withholding of Treatment Cases," 46
Mo. L. REV. 337, 346 (1981)(discussing growth and development of refusal of medical
treatment law).
...See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (discussing instances where state's interests in preservation of
life might outweigh individual's interest in exercise of free choice); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
10, 355 A.2d 647, 664, 670 (stating that treatment is often ordered where chances of
recovery are very good). See also Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978)(discussing state's interest in preservation of life), af'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.
1980); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (1985)(stating that refusal of lifesustaining treatment may not be equated with suicide).

DEATH WITH DIGNITY

19841

care providers, and courts have an interest in legislation which
protects patients' rights and which minimizes the need for litigation.3 10 Treatment decisions are more appropriately made by
consultation than by litigation.
Mississippi's Natural Death Act avoids some of the pitfalls
of earlier legislation. For example, it permits a declaration to be
executed prior to a diagnosis of terminal illness and does not
require periodic reexecution. 311
Unfortunately, Mississippi's Natural Death Act also has
some glaring deficiencies. For example, it does not provide
guidelines where an incompetent patient has not executed a declaration. 1 2 It imposes an apparently stringent filing requirement
and does not address the legal effect of a noncomplying declara314
tion. 313 Further, in several aspects, the statute is ambiguous.
The Act will apply infrequently because it is so narrowly
drafted. 31 5 A broader statute would more readily instruct patients and health care providers. The Act's narrow scope poses
an even more serious problem: health care providers and courts
may read the Act as the exclusive source of a patient's rights.""
Construed in that manner, numerous patients will be forced to
accept unwanted therapies that provide them no net benefit. It
is hoped that counsel for health care providers and courts will
recognize that a patient's constitutional right to privacy guarantees a patient's dignity and self-determination well beyond the
narrow guarantee offered by the Natural Death Act of
Mississippi.3 17

See supra notes 4-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
312 See supra notes 229-56 and accompanying text.
313 Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-107(2).
"I See, e.g., notes 288-309 and accompanying text.
31 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 143 (discussing limitations of many
natural death statutes).
310
'"

310

See id. at 144.

"" See supra notes 139-84 and accompanying text.
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